The Nature of Judicial Power: A Philosophical Evaluation of Election and Appointment Systems and their Impact on the Independence and Impartiality of Judges

Yıldız E.

The 32nd World Congress of the International Association Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, İstanbul, Türkiye, 28 Haziran - 03 Temmuz 2026, ss.73, (Özet Bildiri)

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Özet Bildiri
  • Basıldığı Şehir: İstanbul
  • Basıldığı Ülke: Türkiye
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.73
  • Yozgat Bozok Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

SW 73 | The Nature of Judicial Power: A Philosophical Evaluation of Election and Appointment Systems and their Impact on Judicial Independence and Impartiality THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER: A PHILOSOFICAL EVALUATION OF ELECTION AND APPOINTMENT SYSTEMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY Eda Yıldız* | Yozgat Bozok University (Republic of Turkey) The Venice Commission reports list the requirements for judicial powers to achieve acceptable levels according to the criteria of law in a democratic community. However, these documents omit guidelines on how to optimise judicial elections to ensure a jurisdiction that is protected from interventionist impacts. Despite this, many countries in the Americas use popular election systems for the appointment of judges. There are two perspectives for analysing this discrepancy in the Venice reports. The first suggests that the European mindset is irrelevant to the American reality; therefore, European rationality excludes systems where judges are elected, assuming that they could not perform their duties impartially. The second perspective argues that judicial elections are not mentioned in the reports on ‘judicial independence’ or ‘independence of judiciary’ because appointment by vote inevitably turns judges into political actors. While the first idea offers a subjective reflection centred on its own worldview, the second represents an absolute position based on a judgement of certainty. This distinction raises two essential questions. First: Are there realities independent of our experiences, or do our experiences construct reality? Second: Is there a causal relationship between judicial independence and its methods of appointment, or is this connection merely coincidental? In this presentation, we will analyse the positions of Hume and Kant to reflect on the incompatibility of criteria between the Americas and Europe. We will also consider the exceptional voices of Latin American countries, which, inspired by the traditions of both continents, propose their own unique models of justice. Keywords: judicial independence, Hume, Kant, Venice Commission, democracy through law * Asst. Prof., Yozgat Bozok University, Faculty of Law, Constitutional Law.